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Exchange of Tax Information:
A View from Belgium
States are sovereign and may keep to themselves information of possible fiscal
relevance to other states. Exchange of information is, however, organized inter-
nationally by tax treaties and, within the European Community, by national
statutes implementing two directives. This article studies the coordination of
various legal sources organizing exchange of information, as well as methods of
exchange and the use of the exchanged information.
I. Territoriality of Tax Control
A. PRINCIPLES
Each state enacts its tax laws without practical limitations other than the wish
for effectiveness in respect of assessment and collection of taxes, the theoretical
respect of minimal rights for foreigners,' and the sovereignty of other states2 as
required by international law.3
As an expression of state sovereignty, taxes are territorial: One state may not
impose acts of its sovereignty on the territory of another state.4 This principle of
territoriality is, for practical purposes, identical with the principle of effective-
ness, that is, there is no purpose in creating a tax that one cannot assess or
recover, since there is insufficient connection between the taxpayer or the tax
basis and the territory and the state enforcement powers. This sufficient connec-
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1. A. H. Qureshi, The Freedom of a State to Legislate in Fiscal Matters under General
International Law, 41 BULL. I.B.F.D., 14, 21 (1987); Luc HINNEKENS, DE TtRRTORIALITEIT VAN DE
BELGISCHE BELASTINGEN IN HET ALGEMEEN EN OP DE INKOMSTEN IN HET BIJZONDER 15 (1985).
2. GILBERT TIXIER, ET AL., DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 4 (2d ed. 1979).
3. RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, THE JURISDcTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (1989).
4. G. Crezelius, Beschrankte Steuerpflicht und Gestaltungsmissbrauch, 1984 DER BETRIEB
[DB], 530, 533.
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tion may take two principal forms: If it is personal, it will concern the citizen-
ship, the domicile, the establishment, or the residence of the taxpayer; if it is
real, it will concern the source of the income, or more generally, the localization
of the taxable fact. If one state enjoys fiscal sovereignty, so does the other state.
The fiscal sovereignties coexist with an increasingly unified worldwide economy,
thereby creating international tax problems6 such as double taxation and tax
evasion. The only current solution is reciprocity; inversing the categoric imper-
ative of Kant, the state agrees to do for its neighbor what it wishes the latter
would do for it, including exchange of information. The topic is gaining mo-




Intimately connected with enforcement, fiscal control can be carried out by the
Belgian administration only on Belgian territory. Also, any evidence collected by
Belgian civil servants effecting controls abroad must be considered as obtained
illegally. 8 In spite of their apparently general wording, articles 2289 and 22910 of
the Belgian Code of Income Taxes do not allow requests for inquiries concerning
a Belgian citizen to be sent to persons resident abroad and having no permanent
establishment in Belgium." As for requests for inquiries from foreign adminis-
trations, they can only be accepted by virtue of a statutory authorization.' 2 This
principle of territorial exclusivity can be inversed; it is improper for foreign
administrations to effect controls on Belgian territory, either directly or by ad-
5. See Luc De Broe, Internationale vestigingsbijstand tussen Belgie, de E.E.G.-Lidstaten,
Zwitserland en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika op het vlak der inkomstenbelasting en B. T. W., 1990
TUDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSPERSOON EN VENNOOTSCHAPP [T.R.V.] 71.
6. L. CARTOU, DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPEEN 2 (1986).
7. See International Mutual Assistance Through Exchange of Information, 75b CAHIERS DE
DRorr FIscAL INTERNATIONAL [CAHIERS DR. Fisc. INT.] (1990); see also Protection of Confidential
Information in Tax Matters, 76b CAliERs DR. FIsc. INT. (1991); Andrd Bailleux, L'assistance ad-
ministrative, 1990 REVUE GENERALE DE FIscALZTE [R.G.F.] 207.
8. Arg. Court of Appeals, Antwerp, 27 Sept. 1988, FISCALE JURISPRUDENTIE-JURSPRUDENCE
FISCALE [F.J.F.] 89/162.
9. See Article 228 reads as follows:
The Administration may, concerning a certain taxpayer, collect affidavits, hear third parties, effect investiga-
tions, and request, within the time it sets, such time to be extended for just cause, from natural or legal persons,
as well as from unincorporated associations or bodies, communication of any infortuation which it judges necessary
for ensuring exact collection of the tax.
However, the right to hear third parties or to effect investigations can only be exercised by an officer with a
higher rank than controller. (Translation by author.)
10. Article 229 reads as follows:
The administration may also request from natural or legal persons, as well as from incorporated associations or
bodies, within the time it sets, such time to be extended for just cause, communication of infortnation, for all or
part of their business or activity, concerning any person or group of persons, even if not listed by names, with
which they have been directly or indirectly in relation by virtue of such business or activity. (Translation by author.)
11. Parl. Quest. No. 318, 1988 BULLETIN DES CONTRIBUTIONS [B.C.] 197 (Senator De Clippele).
12. Jean-Pierre Lagae & Ignaas Behaege, Internationale samenwerking tussenfiskale adminis-
traties, in ACTUELE PROBLEMEN VAN FISCAAL RECHT, XVDE POSTUNIVERSITAIRE CYCLUS WILLY
DELVA 1988-1989, at 285, 290 (1989).
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dressing the Belgian administration. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of Brus-
sels was wrong in deciding that, in the absence of any treaty or statute, the
Belgian customs administration could sovereignly decide to give effect to a
request for international assistance. 13 Since such isolationism can only favor
fraud and cause loss of revenue, international treaties or instruments and Belgian
tax statutes allow for international assistance in regard to tax assessment and,
sometimes, collection.
The following section of the article examines, from a Belgian perspective, the
applicable rules concerning income and wealth taxation in relation to the other
Member States of the EEC, to Switzerland, and to the United States.
II. The Texts and Their Hierarchy
A. TEXTS
Belgium has signed double taxation treaties with all of the EEC Member
States, with Switzerland, 14 and with the United States.' 5 Except for the treaty
with France, the conventions regulate the exchange of information in accordance
with the 1963 Draft Convention or with the 1977 Model Convention of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Further,
the Member States of Benelux' 6 are bound by the Convention pertaining to the
Administrative and Judicial Cooperation in the Fields of the Regulations Per-
taining to the Implementation of the Objectives of the Benelux Economic Union
of April 29, 1969, and its additional protocols. For tax matters, this Convention
applies to customs, excise, and turnover taxes. ' 7 It does not, however, apply to
income or wealth taxes. Recently, the OECD Council of Ministers and the
Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe jointly approved a Draft Con-
vention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. 18 The text was
opened for signature on January 25, 1988, and will come into force after rati-
fication by at least five Member States. While Belgium has yet to ratify the
Convention, the Belgian Government seems to view it favorably, although with
certain reservations.
13. See Judgment of 17 Oct. 1977, 1978 PASICRISE [PAS.], II, 39 (Beig.). Accord De Broe,
supra note 5, at 72.
14. Convention of 28 August 1978, Mon. b. 14 October 1980 [hereinafter the Switzerland-
Belgium Tax Treaty]; J. Coremans, Quelques r~flexions sur la convention du 28 aofit 1978 entre la
Belgique et la Suisse, 1983 B.C. 1043.
15. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 9 July 1970, U.S.-BeIg., T.I.A.S. No.
7463, as amended by Protocol of 31 Dec. 1987 [hereinafter U.S.-Belgium Tax Treaty]. Law of
16 June 1989, MONrrEuR BELGE [Mon. B.] 13 Oct. 1989 B.C. 2385).
16. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
17. Article 1.2.a. of the Additional Protocol (including provisions specific to tax matters).
18. See OECD, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN TAX
MATrERS (1989); Daniels, Council of Europe / OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters, 1988 INTERTAX 101-11.
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Domestic Belgian law contains two provisions, voted without much debate in
Parliament,1 9 in order to implement European directives: article 244bis20 of the
Code of Income Taxes,21 implementing Directive No. 77/799 of the Council of
19 December 1977 concerning "mutual assistance by the competent authorities
of the Member States in the field of direct taxation" ;22 and article 93terdecies of
the Code of Valued Added Tax (VAT), 23 implementing Directive No. 79/1070 EEC
of the Council of 6 December 1979 amending the above-mentioned Directive. 24
B. HIERARCHY
The exchange of information between Belgium and the United States, or
between Belgium and Switzerland,25 is governed only by the relevant double tax
treaty. In contrast, the exchange between Belgium and another EEC Member
State can be governed by the relevant treaty in addition to the specific Belgian
provisions implementing the above-mentioned EEC directives. Even a careless
reader will notice that, on the one hand, the Belgian statute does not fully
implement the EEC directives, and that, on the other hand, both the Belgian
statute and the EEC directives are substantially at variance with the bilateral
conventions. Additionally, the statute and the directives allow civil servants to be
sent on duty abroad, which is not provided by the treaties, creating a conflict of
norms. As to VAT matters, exchange of information may give rise to conflict
between the statute, the directive, and the Benelux convention.
1. Statute and Directive
To the extent that the statute goes beyond the directive, the conflict is solved
by article 11 of the directive, which reads: "The foregoing provisions shall not
19. 1980 PASINOMIE [PASIN.] 1152, 1210.
20. The author's translation of article 244bis reads as follows:
The administration of direct taxes may exchange, with fiscal administrations of the other Member States of the
European Economic Community, any information capable of enabling correct assessment of taxes on income and
on wealth within this Community.
The information received from fiscal administrations of other Member States of the European Economic Com-
munity is used within the same conditions as the similar information collected directly by the administration of
direct taxes.
The information destined to the fiscal administration of these States is collected in the same conditions as the
similar information destined to administration of direct taxes.
The administration of direct taxes may also, pursuant to an agreement made with the competent authorities of
a Member State of the European Economic Community, authorize on the national territory the presence of officials
of the fiscal administration of such Member State in view of collecting any information capable of enabling the
correct assessment of taxes on income and on wealth within this Community.
The information collected abroad by an official of the administration of direct taxes within the frame of an
agreement made with a Member State of the European Economic Community may be used in the same conditions
as the information collected within the country by the administration of direct taxes.
21. [Hereinafter C.I.R.].
22. Council Directive 77/789, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 15.
23. [Hereinafter C.T.V.A.].
24. Council Directive 79/1070, 1979 O.J. (L331) 8. A draft modifying directive was proposed
by the Commission on 10 February 1989.
25. J.-M. RIVIER, DRorr FISCAL SuISSE-LE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 214 (1983); Concern-
ing the assistance between Swiss cantons, see J.-M. RIVIER, DROIT FISCAL SUISSE: L'IMPoSITION DU
REVENU ET DE LA FORTUNE 304 (1980).
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impede the fulfillment of any wider obligations to exchange information which
might flow from other legal acts." To the extent the Belgian statute does not fully
authorize the exchange of information prescribed by the directive, the tax ad-
ministration cannot invoke the directive against the taxpayer. 26 The administra-
tion could, however, take advantage of the directive to infringe upon the terri-
toriality principle in a manner that does not harm a particular taxpayer, such as
the "pooling of experiences" provided by article 10 of the directive. 27 Con-
versely, if the statute poorly implemented European provisions that were meant
to protect the taxpayer, one wonders whether the taxpayer could invoke the
directive. In principle, the directives are addressed only to states. Case law has,
however, recognized the theory of direct effect of the directives against the
Member States provided that the directive creates clear and precise obligations in
self-sufficient terms.
28
2. Law, Directive and Treaty
The hierarchy problem does not get simpler when one compares the bilateral
treaties with the statute meant to implement the European directive. In a case in
which the Belgian legislature attempted to escape its obligations under EEC law,
a Belgian court has acknowledged the primacy of international treaties vis-A-vis
subsequent domestic statutes. 29 The case law, however, provides no solution to
the conflict between bilateral treaties and EEC directives.30 If the treaty provides
for a broader exchange of information than the directive, then there is no con-
flict.3 ' However, if the directive provides for a broader exchange of information
than the applicable treaty, then the question arises: Which text prevails? The EEC
Commission could bring infringement proceedings pursuant to article 169 of the
Treaty of Rome against the Member States that have violated their obligations
26. Case 8/81 Becker, 1982 E.C.R. 53; Case 80/86 Criminal Proceedings Against Kolpinghuis
Nigmegen By, 1987 E.C.R. 3969.
27. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, at 19, states:
The Member States shall, together with the Commission, constantly monitor the cooperation procedure provided
for in this Directive and shall pool their experience, especially in the field of transfer pricing within groups of
enterprises, with a view to improving such cooperation and, where appropriate, drawing up a body of rules in the
fields concerned.
28. Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337. Some have held that
certain provisions of the 1977 directive would have such direct effect, notably article 7, which
provides that "all information made known to a Member State under this Directive shall be kept
secret" and organizes the scope of such secret. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, at 18; See
also De Broe, supra note 5, at 75.
29. Court of Cassation, 27 May 1971, 1971 PAS. I, 886 and the advice of Proc. gen. Ganshof
van der Meersch; John Kirkpatrick, Examen de jurisprudence, 1987 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRU-
DENCE BELGE [R.C.J.B.] 642 ( 15 1). Accord article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 and article
26 of the French Constitution of 1946.
30. On the supremacy of European regulations that are directly applicable pursuant to article 189
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 25 Mar. 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I I
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome] (also frequently called the EEC Treaty), vis-A-vis bilateral agreements,
see Case 82/72, C. J. Walder v. Besteuer der Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 1973 E.C.R. 599.
3 1. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 11.
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under the EEC Treaty by not amending their bilateral treaty. 32 In any event, one
could be tempted to hold that the EEC directive automatically preempts the
bilateral treaties.33 Case law is yet to develop on this issue. If the Belgian statute
has implemented the directive on an issue not settled by the applicable treaty,
such as the presence of civil servants abroad, it is clear that the statute will be
applied regardless of the silence of the treaty since the departure from the
territoriality principle has a statutory basis.
III. Exchange of Information
International assistance usually takes the form of exchange of information.
Between June 1, 1985, and June 30, 1988, Belgium sent 376 requests for in-
quiries or items of spontaneous information to foreign tax administrations, and
received 106 from abroad.34 The main exchange countries are, not surprisingly,
the Netherlands and France, countries with which Belgium has the longest com-
mon borders. This article examines the scope, jurisdiction, and procedure for the
exchange of information, as well as the use of information obtained in accor-
dance with such procedures. The focus is on the rules applicable to income and
wealth taxes; the treaties with the United States and with Switzerland do not
provide for any exchange of information with regard to VAT. As to EEC Member
States, the applicable rules are contained in the Belgian statute or in the EEC
directive.35
A. SCOPE
The rules define the limits within which a "petitioning state" may request
information from a "petitioned state." The exchange provided for by the 1963
OECD Draft Convention is limited in scope since article 1 provides that "this
convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Con-
tracting States." The 1977 Model Convention quashes this limitation, and article
26 provides that "the exchange of information is not restricted by article 1." The
Belgian-U.S. convention follows the 1963 Draft. Although concluded on Au-
gust 28, 1978,36 the Belgian-Swiss treaty, in its article 27 governing exchange of
information, does not include the express variance from article 1. The Belgian
32. Cf. Werner F. Ebke, Enforcement Techniques within the European Communities: Flying
Close to the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 685-725 (1985).
33. See Written Question No. 224/82, Answer given by Mr. Tugendhat on behalf of the Com-
mission, 1982 O.J. (C 156) 33; K. VOGEL, DOPPELBESTEUERUNGSABKOMMEN art. 26, no. 59 (2d ed.
1990).
34. Parl. Quest. No. 235, 1989 B.C. 2324 (Rep. Willockx).
35. C. Scailteur, L'assistance mutuelle entre Etats dans le domaine de la TVA., 1978 R.G.F.
285-92.
36. Supra note 14.
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tax administration is of the opinion that exchange of information is restricted to
residents .
Thus, for instance, may Belgium request from the petitioned state information
concerning a person who is a resident neither of Belgium nor of the petitioned
state? By hypothesis, Belgium cannot obtain the appropriate information from
the state of which the person is a resident, either because Belgium has no treaty
with the state or because the existing treaty does not allow the information to be
exchanged. For illustration purposes, let us suppose that a Zairian company has
sold certain products to its Belgian subsidiary, while the permanent establish-
ment of the Zairian company in Ivory Coast sells the same product to an unaf-
filiated Swiss resident. To verify the transfer price between Zaire and Belgium,
Belgium can petition neither Zaire, since the two countries have no double tax
treaty, nor Switzerland, since the information does not fall within the terms of the
Belgian-Swiss treaty. However, the agreement between Belgium and Ivory Coast
allows exchange of information concerning nonresidents. Belgium is therefore in
a position to find out the price invoiced by the Ivorian branch and to compare that
with the price paid by the Belgian subsidiary.
Neither the directive nor the Belgian article 244bis define their personal scope.
It would seem fair to conclude that the laws have no restriction, and that the
directive does not even require that the subject person be a resident of another
Member State. 38 However, most treaties between Belgium and other EEC Mem-
ber States restrict the exchange of information to residents. Only the convention
of 29 April 198 339 with Italy clearly mentions the exception and allows exchange
concerning nonresidents. 40 The statute and the treaties seem to be at odds. The
Belgian tax administration considers that "Belgium complies with the European
directive by the exchange of information provided within the framework of the
conventions preventing double taxation.
' 41
To say that directives and the statute always prevail over the treaties is not
necessary. If the treaty does not allow exchange of information concerning non-
residents, it is because it applies only "to persons which are resident of one
Contracting State or of both Contracting States." The treaty is silent with re-
spect to nonresidents. Accordingly, the Belgian administration finds, in article
244bis, the statutory basis allowing exchange of information concerning non-
residents, and the apparent conflict is solved.42 By contrast, for instance, to
37. COMMENTAIRE DES CONVENTIONS [COM. CONV.] 26/11.
38. But see Lagae, supra note 12, at 314.
39. Mon. b., 28 Sept. 1989.
40. Tax Treaty, 29 Apr. 1983, Belg.-Switz., art. 26.1.
41. COMMENTAIRE DES IMPOTS SUR LES REVENUS [COM. I.R.] 244bis/4; COM. CONV. 26/45
(author's translation).
42. For arguments in favor of this solution, see B. PLAGNET, DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 321,
no. 632 (1986). Contra De Broe, supra note 5, at 86.
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France, 43 Belgium did not expressly insist on reciprocity. Article 244bis is,
however, drafted in a facultative manner. Thus, the Belgian administration will
undoubtedly invoke article 8.3. of the directive"4 if a foreign administration
requests information it would not itself be in a position to supply.
With regard to subject matter, treaties generally provide for exchange of "such
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this convention or
the ones of the domestic laws of the contracting states concerning taxes covered
by the convention, in so far as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the
convention."4 5 The latter phrase enables Belgium to refuse to supply information
if the partner state fails to comply with its conventional obligations. The hy-
pothesis seems rather theoretical. 46 More important is the limitation of the scope
to taxes covered by the convention, which generally means income and wealth
taxation, thus excluding indirect taxes, social security taxes and other taxes. The
treaty with Switzerland contains a third and essential limitation: only information
"necessary for a regular application of the provisions of the convention"4 7 shall
be exchanged. According to the Belgian tax administration,
it follows that only information that can be considered indispensable for verifying a
request by a Belgian or Swiss resident for the benefit of any provision of the Conven-
tion, may be exchanged. The information which is only necessary for the correct
application of the internal law of either contracting State cannot be exchanged. 48
Belgium is, therefore, in a position to ask for information concerning, for ex-
ample, the prerequisites of application of the treaty (for example, residence); the
Belgian withholding tax creditable in Switzerland (article 24, 20, a), or the
amount of the real estate or permanent establishment income to be exonerated in
43. CARTOU, supra note 6, at 304.
44. Article 8.3 provides that "the competent authority of a Member State may refuse to provide
information where the State concerned is unable, for practical or legal reasons, to provide similar
information." Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22.
45. OECD 1977 Model Convention, art. 26.1.
46. The Draft Council of Europe/OECD Convention would also allow refusal of assistance if the
petitioning state intended to use the obtained information for a taxation at variance with the generally
accepted taxation principles (see art. 21, § 2e), which may prove hard to interpret. See Lagae, supra
note 12, at 323.
Article 20.3 of the French-Belgian double tax treaty allows both states to refuse to supply infor-
mation meeting the following criteria:
With respect to their own citizens or to companies or legal persons incorporated pursuant to their own legislation,
any information but the one necessary for apportioning the income of such taxpayer person to articles 4 and 5
[(permanent establishment)] as well as for the control of their entitlement to exemptions or tax reductions provided
by the agreement (author's translation).
See also COM. CONV. 26/14. This restriction should have been abolished since it is obviously contrary
to article 1. 1 of the European directive, which provides that "the competent authorities of the
Member States shall exchange any information that may enable them to effect a correct assessment
of taxes on income and on capital." Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22.
47. According to Swiss case law, such exchange of information is already permitted pursuant to
the amicable procedure provisions. See Judgment of 20 Nov. 1970, Federal Court (CH), ARCHIVEs
DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL [ATF] 96 1 733. See also OECD, 1977 COMMENTARY art. 26, no. 23; RivtER,
supra note 25, at 322 (1983).
48. Author's translation of COM. CONY. 26/11.
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Belgium. It cannot ask for information in order to verify transfer prices pursuant
to article 24 of the Belgian Code of Income Taxes or to determine income taxable
only in the residence state. 49 By contrast, the conventions between the United
States, Belgium, and Switzerland, respectively, allow exchange of information
to prevent fraud or fiscal evasion. This definition of the scope comes quite close
to allowing exchange for the application of domestic law.
5 0
Implementing article 1.1 of the directive, article 244bis of the Income Tax
Code and article 93terdecies of the VAT Code allow exchange of "any infor-
mation enabling correct assessment of income and wealth taxes [respectively
VAT] within [the EEC]." Considering the wording of the bilateral conventions
with other Member States, the only possible conflict between such statute and the
convention would be the hypothesis, which is rather theoretical, where a peti-
tioned state would refuse assistance on the grounds that the petitioning state is
assessing taxes in a manner contrary to the convention.
B. JURISDIcrION
The treaties provide that the exchange of information is to be made through the
"competent authorities" defined by the treaty, which, as far as Belgium is
concerned, often refers to the "competent authority pursuant to its national
legislation" 5 1 and sometimes to the "general director of the direct taxes'' 5 2 or its
authorized representative. 53 The requests for information are made exclusively
through the central administration. Local administrations are instructed to trans-
mit to the central administration both the requests for information that they
receive from a foreign authority and the ones that they propose to address to a
foreign authority as well as information that they feel they have spontaneously to
supply as "revealing manifestly unhabitual transactions or making plausible the
possibility of an important evasion." 54 The only direct exchange permitted be-
49. Philippe F. Lebrun, Echange de renseignements entre administrations, 1977 JOURNAL DE
DROIT FISCAL [J.D.F.] 5, 16; VOGEL, supra note 33, art. 26, no. 42; contra OECD 1977 COMMEN-
TARY art. 26, no. 7(c). The Court of Appeals of Ghent erred by allowing information supplied by the
Swiss administration to be used as evidence for rejecting deduction of interests paid and taxing the
same as "special rebates" within the meaning of article 145, 4' of the Belgian Income Tax Code, and
thus for purely internal purposes. See Judgment of 20 June 1986, ALGEMEEN FISKAAL TUDSCHRIFr
[A.F.T.I 1987, 195 n.; F.J.F. 87/101; Luc De Broe & Ph. Hinnekens, De aanslag op geheime
commissielonen, 1988 TUDscHRIFT VOOR FISCAAL RECHT [T.F.R.] 232; Lagae, supra note 12, at 311.
In a similar setting, the German administration considered it could not petition Switzerland for
information concerning an amount paid by a German to a Swiss resident and merely deducted as an
expense in Germany. See De Broe, supra note 5, at 84 & n.69.
50. Judgment of 23 Dec. 1970, 1972 ARCHIV FUR SCHWEIZERISCHES ABGABENRECHT 437; com-
pare Lagae, supra note 12, at 311.
51. Art. 3(1)(f)(ii) of the U.S.-Belgium Tax Treaty.
52. Art. 3, § 1, 70 of the Switzerland-Belgium Tax Treaty.
53. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, Aug. 29, 1967, U.K.-Belg., art. 3, para 1(i)(2), 734 U.N.T.S. 37, 42.
54. Author's translation; see COM. CONy. 26/15, 26/33 and 26/35.
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tween local administrations concerns farmers whose farmland straddles the
Belgian-Dutch border.55 The European directive designates as competent Bel-
gian authority "the Minister of Finance or an authorized representative." Since
the corresponding Belgian statute respectively nominates the administration of
direct taxes and the one of VAT, registration, and domains, the exchange is
always made at the central administrative level, even within the framework of the
conventions between Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,





Both the bilateral treaties and the Belgian statute remain silent as to how the
exchange procedure is initiated. Formalizing the practice spelled out in the
OECD commentaries, 57 the directive clearly distinguishes the exchange on re-
quest (article 2), the automatic exchange (article 3) and the spontaneous ex-
change (article 4).
a. Exchange on Request
Concerning a "particular case" and after "exhausting its own usual sources
of information," a state may address a request for information to another
one. 58 The first condition stands in the way of what is commonly called a
"fishing expedition." It constitutes a condition of admissibility. The second
condition is more of an exception59 than a condition. Article 5 of the directive
provides that the competent authority of the petitioned state is to act "as
swiftly as possible."
Probably disappointed by previous experience, the Belgian administration
advises seeking international assistance "only if the interests at stake so warrant,
and, in any event, only if the attempts to obtain in Belgium itself the necessary
information have produced no satisfactory results."6 Besides the standard cases
of determining the profits attributable to a permanent establishment or of recti-
fying transfer prices between affiliated enterprises, the administration apparently
focuses on instances where evasion can be suspected, such as use of nominees
for. subscribing shares or debentures or for receiving income and exaggerated
purchase price without booking of corresponding credit notes. 6
1
55. COM. CONV. 26/29.
56. COM. CONV. 26/45, and 26/46.
57. OECD, COMMENTARY art. 26, no. 7; OECD 1977 COMMENTARY, art. 26, no. 9.
58. Council Directive 79/799, supra note 22, art. 2.1.
59. For details see infra part III.D.
60. COM. CONV. 26/31.
61. COM. CONV. 26/31, 26/32.
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b. Automatic Exchange
The automatic exchange, according to the directive, concerns "categories of
instances" determined by the Member States within the bi- or multilateral con-
sultation procedure prescribed by article 9. The exchange is to be initiated
"regularly" and "without prior request." Pending the outcome of such consul-
tation, the automatic exchange remains limited to the practice following from the
implementation of the treaties, which means forwarding files including requests
for tax reduction or exemption by beneficiaries of income having its source in the
other state, such as dividends, interests, royalties, and wages of cross-border
workers. 62 France apparently automatically communicates information on roy-
alties, commissions, or compensations exceeding a certain amount, 63 while
France and Belgium automatically inform each other concerning any purchase of
real estate by a resident of the other state. 64
c. Spontaneous Exchange
Much like automatic exchange, spontaneous exchange occurs without prior
request of the other state. The difference is that it occurs in situations where the
administration has "grounds for assuming" the existence of a tax fraud or
evasion to the detriment of the other state. Spontaneous exchange is an exercise
of judgment and no mere automatism. Until now, the Belgian practice has been
restricted to instances "making likely the possibility of an important fraud."
65
Spontaneous exchange is legal, even if there is no statute implementing the
treaty.66 The directive prescribes spontaneous exchange in five instances,67 with-
out prejudice to the Member States extending the list within the consultation
procedure. Thus, Germany has spontaneously informed Belgium that commis-
sions had been paid to Belgian residents by means of bearer checks. Germany
informed France that a payment had been made to a French resident on a Lux-
embourg bank account. Germany also informs partner states about situations in
which German companies intervene as base companies for treaty-shopping pur-
62. COM. CONV. 26/21.
63. FIsKOLooG INTERNATIONAAL, 15 Aug. 1985, at 21.
64. Guy GEST & GILBERT TIxIER, DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL § 494 (2d ed. 1990).
65. COM. CONY. 26/35.
66. For an example of an application of the German-Belgian Treaty, see Judgment of 20 Apr.
1982, Finance Court Dusseldorf, 1983 EuR. TAX'N 364. For the application of the French-German
Treaty see Judgment of 20 Jan. 1988, Federal Finance Court, Bundessteuerblatt [BStBI] 1988 I 412;
Killius, Exchange of information amongst EEC-Member States, 1988 EUR. TAX'N 226. It has been
held that the Belgian-Dutch Treaty and other treaties following the 1963 OECD Draft Convention
allow exchange upon request only. See C. Van Raad & E. Milders, Uitwisseling van inlichtingen in
de Nederlandse belastingverdragen en de verhouding daarvan tot andere regelingen, 1988 MAAND-
BLAD VAN BELASTINGRECHT EN BELASTINGPRAKTUK [MBB] 58, 60.
67. Tax is lost in the other state; an exemption in one state should trigger taxation in the other
one; transactions are conducted through a third country; profits are artificially transferred; informa-
tion interesting the other state has been found as feedback to information it supplied. Judgment of
20 Apr. 1982, Finance Court Dusseldorf, 1983 EuR. TAX'N 364; Judgment of 20 Jan. 1988, Federal
Finance Court, BstBQ 1988 II 412.
SUMMER 1992
378 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
poses or as nominees. 68 However, as a general rule, the Swiss administration
does not spontaneously communicate information.
2. Instruction
a. Information and Recourse of the Concerned Person
Contrary to other countries such as Germany,69 the Netherlands, 70 or Swit-
zerland,7 1 in the absence of an express provision in the treaties and the directive,
the Belgian statute does not require that the administration inform the taxpayer
that it intends to request or communicate information concerning him. If the
taxpayer finds out anyway and has grounds to oppose such exchange, he can try
to have the request or the communication prohibited. Despite the lack of specific
case law in Belgium, the president of the Civil Court, sitting in Chambers, 72 has
in multiple instances retained jurisdiction in tax matters and recently enjoined the
illegal use of information collected in the books of a financial institution for
purposes of taxation of its clients. 73 If the exchange has been effected and the
taxpayer argues successfully that the exchange was illegal, the tax assessed on
the basis of the illegally obtained information should be squashed. The taxpayer
can also try to seek tort damages from the Belgian state, for example, for
noncompliance with the principles of good administration, 74 or criminal damages
from civil servants on the ground that they violated professional secrecy. 75 The
court will have to determine both in fact and in law if the suffered damages
constitute indemnifiable damages.76
b. Collection of Information
The directive demands that the petitioned state shall "arrange for the conduct
of any inquiries necessary to obtain [the requested] information. ' 77 For this
68. Axel Haelterman, 1987 FiSKOLOOG INTERNATIONAAL, no. 43, at 7.
69. H. Krabbe, Das EG-Amtshilfe-Gesetz, 1986 REcHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WiRTSCHAFr
[RIW] 126, 132.
70. A.H.M. DANIELS, DE GRENSOVERSCHRIJDENDE GEGEVENSUITWISSELING DOOR BELASTINGAD-
MINISTRATIES 58 (1987).
71. RivIER, supra note 25, at 324.
72. BELGIAN JUDICIAL CODE art. 584 (R~ffrts).
73. Judgment of 10 Oct. 1988, Civil Court of Brussels (in chambers)), F.J.F. 89/196. The
Belgian Income Tax Code restricts domestic collection of information from financial institutions. See
C.I.R. arts. 224, 235(3).
74. Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, Droit commun et droitfiscal, 1989 J.D.F. 5, 25.
75. Belgian Criminal Code art. 438; C.I.R. art. 244.
76. The damage following from the fines inflicted on a French resident for a breach of the
exchange control regulations is not indemnifiable if the latter misdemeanor has been discovered due
to the violation of the professional secrecy of a Swiss bank employee. Federal Court (CH), Judgment
of 14 Feb. 1989, Federal Court (CH) 1989 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 607. For a curious instance in which
where the Belgian taxpayer could have successfully argued that the Belgian state wrongfully ex-
changed information and caused loss of customers, see Lagae, supra note 12, at 322, 324 n.278;
Bailleux, supra note 7, at 213.
77. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 2.2.
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purpose, the Belgian administration uses the investigation powers vested with it
respectively by the Income Tax Code and the VAT Code. The information des-
tined for the foreign tax administration is to be collected "within the same
conditions as the similar information destined to the Belgian administration."-
78
Article 6 of the directive under the heading "Collaboration by officials of the
State concerned" introduced an important innovation. The text provides that the
Member State may, within the framework of the consultation procedure, agree
"to authorize the presence in the first Member State of officials of the tax
administration of the other Member State. The details for applying this provision
shall be determined under the same procedure.' 
79
The Belgian statute accordingly allows the concerned administration to make
agreements with the competent authority of another Member State and to autho-
rize the presence in Belgium of foreign civil servants, "in view to collect any
information"; conversely, it allows the use in Belgium of" information collected
abroad" by a Belgian civil servant within such framework. Until the adminis-
tration makes such agreements, 80 and considering the discretion left by the
directive concerning the details of implementation, it seems premature to wonder
about the degree of involvement of the foreign civil servant. Will he be merely
present; will he collaborate in the collection of information, or is he to play a
leading part therein? 8 1 The agreements should decide which law applies to the
investigation. However, it seems reasonable to apply the local law. Within the
Benelux framework, for customs and excise purposes only, the civil servants of
one country can be detached abroad either for collecting information in the
offices of the foreign administration, or for accompanying the local civil servants
during their inquiry. In the latter case, the civil servant of the foreign country
may collaborate with the local civil servants in such inquiry.
82
One should not confuse collaboration with the mere presence of tax civil
servants detached to embassies, notably French ones, with the agreement of the
welcoming state. These civil servants may not, under any circumstances, have
contact with the local Belgian tax administration. 83 However, since 1970, Ger-
many, France, the United States and Great Britain have cooperated in an effort
to gain simultaneous control of multinational groups.
84
78. According to C.I.R. arts. 221 et. seq.
79. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 6.
80. But see 1989 B.C. 2324 (the answer of the Belgian Minister of Finance, implying that
controls have already been made according to such procedure).
81. Lagae, supra note 12, at 308; P. Dekker, Netherlands Cross-border Information under Tax
Law, 1987 EuR. TAX'N 111.
82. OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, art. 6(3) Additional
Protocol art. 6. See sources cited supra note 18.
83. Belgian Administrative Circular CiRH 81/375750; FiSKOLOOG INTERNATIONAAL, 15 Dec.
1986, no: 37, at 2.
84. CARTou, supra note 6, at 310.
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D. EXCEPTIONS
Pursuant to both the treaties and the directive, the assistance is compulsory.
The petitioned state must supply the required information or effect automatic or
spontaneous exchange in the provided instances. From this point of view, the
Belgian statute is misleading since it states that the administration "may ex-
change . . . all information." The legislature probably used a clumsy technique
for incorporating the exceptions to this duty of information since they are not
specifically spelled out.
1. Exhaustion of Internal Sources
One should remember that
the competent authority of the requested State need not comply with the request if it
appears that the competent authority of the State making the request has not exhausted
its own usual sources of information, which it could have utilized, according to the
circumstances, to obtain the information requested without running the risk of endan-
gering the attainment of the sought after result.85
This constitutes a rule of good conduct for the petitioning state, and the peti-
tioned state will have to assume that it is petitioned for a reason. This rule is not
stated explicitly in the treaties, but appears to be implicit therein.
2. Legislation and Administrative Practice
The treaties permit a refusal to supply information in contravention not only of
the legislation of the petitioned state, but also of its administrative practice or of
the legislation or practice of the petitioning state. As a commentator has noted,
"the field of the assessment assistance is restricted to the exchange on the basis
of the more restrictive of both legislations" 8 6 and of the more restrictive of both
administrative practices. Depending on the concerned treaty, such limitation
shall be compulsory or optional. Thus, the Swiss administration has refused to
communicate information in the authenticated form required to make it admis-
sible in evidence in U.S. criminal procedures.8 7 The petitioned administration
will have to use its investigative power even if that power has been vested with
it in order to determine national taxes and even if the information concerned is
not useful for assessing such a tax; otherwise, the assistance organized by the
treaty would be without substance. 8
The directive states, in somewhat different terms, the reservation allowing the
petitioned state to take refuge behind its legislation or its administrative prac-
85. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 2.1.
86. TIxIER, supra note 2, no. 508 (translation by author of this article).
87. Judgment of 16 May 1975, Federal Court (CH), 1975 ARCHIV SCHWEIZ. ABGABENRECHT
210.
88. Judgment of 20 Feb. 1979, Federal Finance Court (D), BStBI II, 269; Judgment of 23 Dec.
1970, Federal Court (CH) 1972 ARCHlV SCHWEIZ. ABGABENRECHT 437.
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tice 8 9 or to refuse exchange when the petitioning state would not be in a position,
as a matter of fact or law, to communicate equivalent information. 90 The rule of
limitative cumulation finds its basis in reciprocity, the cornerstone of interna-
tional relations. Needless to say, the Belgian administration is not to collect
information in a manner that violates the Belgian statute. A refusal on the basis
of the Belgian administrative practice or of the foreign statute or administrative
practice, however, seems to be optional. 91 As for information coming from
abroad, it should not be allowed as evidence if it has been collected in breach of
the applicable foreign statute. 92 The question appears more delicate if it concerns
information obtained legally abroad but which could not have been obtained in
Belgium. The Belgian statute only provides that the information is "used [under]
the same conditions as . . . similar information collected directly by the [Bel-
gian] administration." 93 The courts may analyze this issue on a case-by-case
basis and show more leniency toward information legally collected abroad for the
collection of which the Belgian administration would have been time barred.
Perhaps courts will also want to censor instances where the Belgian administra-
tion purposely sought to obtain information abroad that it was not in a position
to obtain in Belgium because of a protected professional secret.
The draft directive modifying article 8.2 attempted, within the perspective of
the single financial market that opened on July 1, 1990, 94 to eliminate the reserve
deduced from the administrative practice when presumptions exist that a resident
of the petitioning state "directly or through another country transfers important
funds in the petitioned State without the corresponding income having been
declared." This was a text tailor-made for Luxembourg, whose banking secrecy
was based on pure administrative practice. Less than one month after the pub-
lication of the draft, the Luxembourg banking secrecy was molded in the Grand
Ducal decree of March 24, 1989, which specified "banking secrecy in tax mat-
89. The provision of information may be refused where it would lead to the disclosure of a
commercial, industrial, or professional secret, or of a commercial process, or where it would be
contrary to public policy. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 8.1.
90. Id. art. 8.3.
91. The French-Belgian treaty however provides for exchange "under condition of reciprocity"
(art. 20.1) and allows for-without imposing-a refusal of exchange of information which, by virtue
of its nature, could not be obtained in the other contracting state on the basis of the tax legislation
of such other contracting state (art. 23). Herein lies an antinomy: is reciprocity a condition, in which
event the second text should have provided for a prohibition, or merely an aspiration? France can
refuse assistance when the statute of limitations has run in either state or when the banking secrecy
of the other state would prohibit exchange of similar information. See PLAGNET, supra note 42, at
320, no. 629). In the relations between Belgium and France, is the refusal on the basis of the absence
of reciprocity compulsory? For an affirmative answer, see De Broe, supra note 5, at 90).
92. De Broe, supra note 5, at 88.
93. C.I.R. art. 244bis, al. 2.; C.T.V.A. art. 93terdecies, al. 2.
94. Claude Lempereur, Harmonisation du droit des valeurs mobilieres et intigration des marchis
de valeurs mobilires dans la Communautg, in L'INSTAURATION DU MARCHE INTERIEUR 147-205
(1989).
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ters and defin[ed] the investigation right of the tax administration." 95 Such a
decree is a statutory instrument that the draft directive does not block. To date,
the draft directive has not been adopted or modified.
3. Business Secrets and Public Policy
Both the treaties and the directive allow, in similar terms, the refusal of
information that would reveal a commercial, industrial, or business secret, or the
divulgence of which would be contrary to public policy. The treaty with France
even prohibits exchange of information susceptible of affecting a commercial or
industrial secret.
Except for professional secrets, which logically fall under the legislation ex-
ception, the notions of commercial or industrial secrets or of public policy appear
practically devoid of content, particularly within a European process of unifica-
tion. Where shall one find in tax information a possibility of "considerable
damage to the economy of the [petitioned] State" ?96 This concern with protec-
tion against foreign competition is similar to the preoccupation with public
policy, but, "in practice, the public policy clause appears to be in fact an easy
way [of] allowing the petitioned State to deny information without justifica-
tion." 97 The Belgian-Swiss treaty protects banking secrecy, 98 which may, how-
ever, in Swiss internal law and according to the international criminal assistance
rules, be lifted in case of tax fraud. 99
4. Restrictions on Use
The directive allows the denial of information if the legislation or the admin-
istrative practice of the petitioned state more narrowly restricts the use of the
95. Cf. FISKOLOOG INTERNATIONAAL, 15 July 1989, no. 68, at 1.
96. Judgment of 20 Feb. 1979, BStBI 1979, II, at 268; Judgment of 20 April 1982, 1983 EuR.
TAX'N 364.
97. TIXIER, supra note 2, nos. 516, 519 (translation by author of this article). It seems that
German courts have refused administrative assistance when the taxes in the petitioning state were
abnormally high (Judgment of 29 June 1987, Finance Court Hannover, 1987 RIW 88) or when
the exchange would have exposed the concerned person in the petitioning state to criminal
prosecution of a nonfiscal nature, e.g., in exchange control matters. See Killius, supra note 66, at
266.
98. On banking secrecy in Belgium, see Judgment of 25 Oct. 1978, Court of Cassation, 1979
JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [J.T.] 371 (noted by A. Bruyneel); Marc Dassesse, La banque, le client et
lefisc dans la vie quotidienne, in LA BANQUE DANS LA VIE QUOTIDIENNE 247 (1986); H. R. Depret,
Le secret bancaire dans le cadre des pouvoirs d'investigations du fisc, 1981 FISCALIrE EUROPEENNE
[Fisc. EUR.] 21. See also Belgian statute of 17 July 1990, Mon. b., 15 Aug. 1990, on money
laundering and Council Directive 91/308 of 10 June 1991, 1991 O.J. (L 166), on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering.
99. P. Neyroud, Entraide judiciaire internationale en mati&re pnale, in L'ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE
INTERNATIONALE 31 (1986); Luc De Broe, De internationale rechtshulp in fiscale strafzaken, 1989
T.F.R. 348. For provisions applicable in the relations between Switzerland and the United States, see
RIVIER, supra note 26, at 320 (1983).
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information than does the directive, and if the petitioned state does not undertake
to comply with such limits.l°°
E. USE OF THE INFORMATION
1. Secrecy
Secrecy is the first principle, stated by both the treaties and the directive, that
the administration must adhere to. Although poorly drafted, article 244bis, sec-
tion 2, of the Belgian Code of Income Taxes introduces a stricter secrecy policy
in the international setting than the one organized by articles 243 and 244 of the
Code for internal purposes.' 0' In its wisdom the Belgian administration pre-
scribes that the information coming from abroad is to be filed separately. 10 2
Obviously, if information is exchanged, it is destined to be used. The secrecy is
accordingly subject to exceptions.
2. Assessment
The first type of use, allowed by both the treaties and the directives, is the
assessment of taxes on income and wealth. In the European framework one may
add assessment of VAT, which, according to the Belgian administration, should
allow exchange between the two Belgian administrations involved, the admin-
istration of income tax and the administration of VAT.' 0 3 Consequently, the
administration considers that the directive preempts the treaty, while the latter
provides for an express prohibition. Assessment is to be made in compliance
with the Belgian rules, including statute of limitation' 4 and admissibility of
evidence. Except for a more permissive provision in the treaty, which is allowed
by article 7.3 of the directive, use of the collected information for assessing other
taxes or for assessing social security contributions does not appear to be allowed.
3. Collection
Curiously, the directive does not provide for the use of the information in order
to collect taxes. Since the direction allows the petitioned state to permit a broader
use than the one provided by the directive, 10 5 the treaty clauses allowing com-
munication to the authorities entrusted with the collection should be granted full
effect. 106 The information obtained by the administration of direct taxes should
100. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 7.2; see also text infra part II.E.
101. For VAT, the corresponding provisions are C.T.V.A. arts. 93terdecies, al. 2; 93quaterdecies,
§ 2; 93bis.
102. COM. CONY. 26/13.
103. COM. I.R. 244bis/43.
104. C.I.R. arts. 240, 259.
105. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 7.3.
106. Collection assistance is organized for agricultural claims (refund, intervention, levy), for
customs duties and for VAT Council Directive 76/308, 1976 O.J. (L 73), modified by Council
Directive 79/1071, 1979 O.J. (L 331).
SUMMER 1992
384 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
normally not be used for collecting VAT, nor conversely. The Belgian-U.S.
convention expressly provides for assistance in collection, subject to certain
limitations. 107
4. Criminal Prosecution in Tax Matters
Article 7.1 of the directive further allows that the information
may in addition be made known only in connection with judicial proceedings or ad-
ministrative proceedings involving sanctions undertaken with a view to, or relating to,
the making or reviewing the tax assessment and only to persons who are directly
involved in such proceedings; such information may, however, be disclosed during
public hearings or in judgments if the competent authority of the Member State sup-
plying the information raises no objection.°0 8
The recitals state that "the Member States receiving such information should not
use it, without the authorization of the Member State supplying it, other than for
the purposes of taxation or to facilitate legal proceedings for failure to observe
the tax laws of the receiving State." 1° 9 The correct interpretation of these texts
is, in our view, that the information cannot be used for initiating the tax criminal
procedure but once it has been initiated, the information can be transmitted to the
prosecutor's office.
The petitioned state cannot oppose such use, unless it has otherwise agreed
before the communication, possibly in a double tax treaty, and its law or its
administrative practice prohibits such use. What the petitioned state may oppose
is that the information be used during public hearings or in judgments. In our
view, the directive does not change much. Either the treaties prohibit the use for
tax criminal purposes, and the prohibition remains valid pursuant to article 7.2
of the directive, or the treaties allow the communication to judicial authorities
with a view to criminal prosecution, and such clause is to be granted full effect
pursuant to article 7.3 of the directive." 0 What changes is that the treaty clause
prohibiting any use for criminal purposes is contrary to the directive where the
law and the administrative practice of the petitioned state allow use of informa-
tion obtained by the administration for the tax criminal purposes allowed by the
directive, which is the case in Belgium."' Belgium accordingly will have to
adapt its treaties on this point. What might change is that, since the broadening
of the scope of use allowed by article 7.3 is only permitted if the internal law of
the petitioned state allows a use "for similar purposes . . . in the same circum-
107. U.S.-Belg. Tax Treaty, supra note 15, arts. 26.1, 27.
108. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 7.1.
109. Id. recital.
110. The communication for criminal prosecution is, within the EEC framework, allowed by the
conventions between Belgium and Germany, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. The convention
between Belgium and Italy only refers to poursuites (prosecution), while the other texts expressly
mention criminal prosecution. The Belgian-Italian treaty, however, made in 1983, actually follows
the OECD 1977 Model, which was an innovation on this point when compared with the 1963 Draft.
The possible ambiguity of the French word poursuites, which may refer to both civil and criminal
prosecution, exists also in the Dutch text (vervolging) and in the Italian text (procedimenti).
111. C.I.R. art. 244; C.T.V.A. 93bis.
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stances," the broad treaty clause would be illegal in the hypothesis where the
treaty goes further than the internal law. Although this is not the case in Belgium,
it could be in certain of the partner states.
As for the Belgian-Swiss and Belgium-U.S. conventions, they allow use for
purposes of tax criminal prosecution. Even though the exchange of information
between Belgium and Switzerland is restricted to information necessary for a
regular application of the treaty, it is possible that the information would be
relevant for tax criminal purposes. In our view, it is not necessary that the crime
triggering prosecution be itself a crime against the treaty-which would be
12impossible since the treaty does not provide for criminal sanctions.
5. General Criminal Prosecution
The exchange of information might be useful for furthering nontax criminal
prosecution, for example, prosecution for forgery, false balance sheet, or breach
of exchange control regulations. The directive provides that the information
"shall in no circumstances be used other than for taxation purposes or in con-
nection with judicial proceedings or administrative proceedings involving sanc-
tions undertaken with a view to, or in relation to, the making or reviewing the
tax assessment." ' 1 3 This prohibition can however be lifted in the instances
provided by article 7.3. The treaties that differ from the OECD model by al-
lowing use for general criminal purposes should accordingly receive effect. They
should not, however, be used in place of specific international instruments that
exist to deter criminal activity, such as the European Treaty of April 20, 1959,
concerning the judicial assistance in criminal matters or the Benelux treaty of
June 27, 1962, for extradition and judicial assistance in criminal matters. 114
Switzerland, however, refuses to allow information supplied pursuant to criminal
assistance to be used for tax purposes. 115 Information irregularly obtained must
be disregarded by criminal jurisdictions. 116
6. Transmission to Third States
The directive does not allow transmission of information to a third state,
except with the agreement of the competent authority that originally supplied the
information. 1 1 7 In case of subsequent transmission to a fourth state, it appears
logical to also require the agreement of the first petitioned state. The treaties do
not provide for such transmission.
112. This author's view is not shared by De Broe. See supra note 5, at 94-95; see also Lagae,
supra note 12, at 316 n.215.
113. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 7.1.
114. Mon. b., 24 Oct. 1967.
115. Judgment of 9 Oct. 1981, Federal Court (CH), 1982 J.D.F. 350 (noted by Jacques Malherbe).
116. Judgment of 28 Oct. 1988, Crim. Court of Brussels, F.J.F. 89/43; Judgment of 30 Oct.
1986, Court of Appeals of Antwerp, 1986-1987 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1402 (noted by Marc
Huybrechts); De Broe, supra note 99, at 348; M. Wisselinck, Strafrechtelijke bijstandverdragen en
belastingfraude, 1982 MBB 175, 177.
117. Council Directive 77/799, supra note 22, art. 7.4.
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IV. Conclusion
The exchange of information between tax administrations appears normal
when one admits that international tax law must remedy not only double taxation,
but also double nontaxation achieved by fiscal evasion. The EEC directives
constitute a first rather timid step toward reinforcing this exchange within a
framework that is meant to be increasingly federal, or at least confederal, which
brings to the fore the question of retaining reservations in regard to business
secrecy on public policy. New steps have been taken with the two directives and
the EEC treaty, all of July 23, 1990.
t18
Regretfully, article 11 of the European directive on exchange of information
has only bypassed the problem of coordination with existing, mostly bilateral,
treaties. Also, and even more regretfully, the Belgian legislature has elected to
implement the EEC principles "en trompe-l'oeil." As a result, a reader of the
Belgian Income Tax Code who is unaware of the directive cannot perceive the
bearing and the limitations of the powers and obligations of the administration.
118. Council Directive 90/434 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divi-
sions, transfers of assets, and exchange of shares concerning companies of different Member States,
1990 O.J. (L 225) 1.
Directive 90/435 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6.
Council Directive 90/435, the Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with
the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10.
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